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Rachel H. Smith 
The Legal Imagination: Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought 
and Expression. By James Boyd White. Wolters Kluwer, 2018. 
Pp. 986, $75. 
This book, now available in a 45th-anniversary edition, is a 
marvel for its breadth and creativity. It remains a must-read for 
lawyers, law students, and law professors, even those who are not 
familiar with the Law as Literature movement for which the book 
was a founding contribution. Those who read it decades ago 
would be well served by a revisit because the book’s care and at-
tention to legal language remain uniquely powerful. 
The author, James Boyd White, describes the book in an In-
troduction to the Student as “an advanced course in reading and 
writing, a study of what lawyers and judges do with words.”1PP But 
he acknowledges in the new Foreword to the Anniversary Edi-
tion that the book’s reach is much greater and that it can be read 
“not only by people of the law, but by anyone with an interest in 
language and power, in writing as a way of thinking and creating, 
or in culture as a reality and force.”2PP In fact, the book’s true pro-
ject seems to be broader still — it is a survey of the humanities 
and the history of Western thought (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, 
William Shakespeare, Alexander Pope, William Blake, Jane Aus-
ten, Walt Whitman, Mark Twain, Robert Frost, etc.), an educa-
tion in close reading and critical thinking, and a primer on how to 
be a person with integrity. Basically, the book is a curriculum of 
what, in a perfect world, all law students would know in addition 
to what law school traditionally teaches them. 
 
1 James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination: Studies in the Nature of Legal 
Thought and Expression xxxix (2018). 
2 Id. at xxi. 
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The Legal Imagination engages with questions so deep that 
they feel mystical. The book presents its thesis as follows: “that 
the activities which make up the professional life of the lawyer 
and judge constitute an enterprise of the imagination, an enter-
prise whose central performance is the claim of meaning against 
the odds: the translation of the imagination into reality by the 
power of language.”3PP In support of this idea, the book asks the 
reader hard questions: Why would someone become a lawyer? 
How does the language of the law change the lawyer who uses it? 
Is language capable of describing people fairly? Can the language 
of the law effectively organize experience and behavior? How did 
the law allow for the evil of slavery, and what other evils does it 
still condone? How is a judicial opinion like a poem and a judge 
like a poet? 
The book is organized into seven chapters, each dealing with 
an aspect of how the law and language intersect. For example, 
there are chapters on the lawyer as writer, how the law talks about 
people, rules and relationships, and judgment and explanation. 
Within each chapter are readings from a range of sources, essays 
by the author, discussion questions, references to more readings, 
and writing assignments. Despite its breadth, the book is consis-
tently focused on the individual reader. It asks the reader to en-
gage with the discussion questions and writing assignments on a 
personal level, to not write vague or clichéd responses as one 
might in a college paper, but to really think deeply about what the 
text means for the reader’s own experience. For example, the 
book describes one writing assignment as “an invitation to pursue 
your own line of thought in your own way.”4 
At the same time that the book is profoundly intellectual, it 
uses ordinary language outside the lexicon of law school — 
 
3 Id. at 758. 
4 Id. at 856. 
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principally, the idea of voice and conversation — to describe the 
complexity of legal structures, processes, and practice. By doing 
so, the book is accessible to a reader who is new to thinking about 
the law as a literary endeavor. For example, the following passage 
is a description of what it really means to say that the purpose of 
law school is to learn “to think like a lawyer”: 
[T]he lawyer must master not one voice but a variety of 
voices, to be used in an enormous diversity of conversations; 
yet never does he seem to be free to speak directly and easily 
in his own way, to say what is actually on his mind. Faced 
with the unbudging uniqueness of things, he is engaged in a 
perpetual struggle with what others have said, with what the 
law has given him to work with; and it is no wonder if you 
conclude that he is bound by restraints of intolerable rigid-
ity. To ask him whether he is able to say what he wants is to 
ask him to address a sea of difficulties, and it should not sur-
prise you to be told by a particular lawyer that he chooses 
not to ask that question of himself.5 
One essay by the author that is particularly thought-provok-
ing asks the reader to compare the judgment of the characters in 
Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice to the judgment of the legal 
system during sentencing.6PP The essay explains that Pride and Prej-
udice “can be said to dramatize . . . what it means in human and 
social terms to reduce experience to a narrow range of responses, 
to impose rigid and flat identities upon oneself and others — to 
speak, that is, as the law seems to speak.”7PP And the book offers 
many similar treasures. For example, an extended section pro-
vides classic poems and then asks the reader to compare them to 
judicial opinions, explaining that “[o]ur central question is 
whether the judicial opinion, like the poem, has a form with its 
 
5 Id. at 195. 
6 Id. at 401–07. 
7 Id. at 403. 
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own meaning — its own resources for expression and demands 
on the reader and writer — and if so, how that form can be de-
fined.”8 
The book is both burdened and liberated by the era in which 
it was written. Because there have been no changes to the text — 
this anniversary edition is a reprint, not a revision — the reader 
will often notice how different things were in 1973. The book is 
concerned with all the ways that language does not work the way 
we want it to. But with the passage of time, this gap between what 
we mean and what we say is as obvious from the book itself as 
from the examples it uses to illustrate the point. Although it often 
questions the assumptions and biases inherent in the language of 
the law, the book has its own blind spots. For example, as the 
author acknowledges with embarrassment in the new Foreword, 
the book uses only male pronouns “to refer to all human beings.”9PP 
This stylistic choice feels outdated, as does racial terminology that 
is used throughout. Indeed, the book’s treatment of race may at 
times make the modern reader uncomfortable, since it can feel re-
ductive and insensitive even as it argues that the language we use 
about race needs to be nuanced and thoughtful. The book’s focus 
in many places on the overt racism of the past — slavery and seg-
regation — now feels less useful than an interrogation of modern 
institutional racism would be. And the book often uses golf, foot-
ball, church, and private clubs as examples even though that lan-
guage will not resonate with many readers. 
But the book also engages debates that today feel calcified by 
politics but that were still fresh and perhaps less partisan in 1973, 
such as abortion, the death penalty, incarceration, mental illness, 
policing, sentencing, and surveillance. It is enlivening to remem-
ber that there are many questions to ask about these topics and 
 
8 Id. at 801. 
9 Id. at xxiii. 
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many angles from which to consider them. And some of the more 
anachronistic pieces are useful in how far removed they feel from 
the current cultural moment. There is a Wall Street Journal article 
from 1969 about “hippies” that the book asks the reader to ana-
lyze for how it caricatures its subjects. The book asks: “Would 
‘psychedelic shirts and dangling beads’ put your ‘nerves on edge’? 
What would they do to you? How do you respond to such ap-
parel, and how would you respond if you were a judge?”10PP The 
modern reader will benefit from thinking about the cultural as-
sumptions that were different 45 years ago and trying to find anal-
ogies to today. 
At its best, this book inspires the reader to think about the 
practice of law as a way to engage with language, imagination, and 
our world. The book explains: “The law makes a world. It is our 
task to acquire the art of reading and speaking the language of that 
world.”11PP The book asks and even implores the reader to think 
about what the law is and how it could be better. These questions 
are as important now as they were in 1973 — so much so that a 
true update of this text, to make it more modern and inclusive, 
would be a tremendous contribution to our current discourse. 
Our law and culture have changed so much in 45 years that an 
updated edition of The Legal Imagination would be invaluable. 
The modern reader is left to imagine how such a book would treat 
the topics of corporate speech, gay marriage, mass incarceration, 
and digital privacy, to name only a few. These are all topics that 
resonate with and complicate the subjects in the book’s anniver-
sary edition. As an expression of the gravity and complexity of 
being a lawyer and a person, the book in this original version — 
at almost 1,000 pages — is important, but still incomplete. 
 
 
10 Id. at 392. 
11 Id. at xxii. 
